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"The Iliac Passion" traces a return from the new but busy and rapidly growing discipline of
"bioethics" to its source in "fundamental philosophical inquiry." The dilemma between
bioethics and medicine is examined in two ways. First, the philosophical concept of the "big
question" is presented. Ifwe ask of life or of human experience "What does it all mean?", the
"it" needs tobe defined, andwhat I propose to do is to "take on" the "it." In Part Two, the task
of combining the medical-technical objectifying mode of thinking about patients, necessary to
treat them effectively, with the ability to understand and sympathize with their pain and
distress, is illustrated by means of a personal story or parable.
Philosophy's chickens-wayward beasts-have come home to roost in medicine's
attic. What is life? What is death? Is the zygote sacrosanct? In recentyears, bioethics
has picked up many of the questions and problems generated by fundamental
philosophical inquiry into medical matters. By now, bioethicists have been fairlywell
accepted in many medical schools and hospitals as helpful' colleagues. But concep-
tual difficulties remain. A bioethicist discussing the relationship between longevity
and quality oflife is on productive ground when it comes to counseling a patient, but
that ground muddies when "quality of life" is examined beyond its usual, standard
issues of interest and involvement of the individual in the activities, pleasures, and
returns of daily existence, family life, occupational or professional work, particular
interests, or special recreations. Patients and colleagues may be fresh and perhaps
exciting, but the worm of ennui seems to have arisen in the internal body-ethical of
the discipline-an intruder together with other intruders. In a recent article on the
state ofbioethics, The New York Times reports that Daniel Callahan, a central figure
in the field, holds now that ".... the very success of bioethics in responding to
demands for practical guide-lines on matter like 'living wills' had deflected the field
from essential 'big questions' about the purposes and limits ofmedicine, science and
ultimately human nature. Mr. Callahan laments that bioethics has entered what he
calls its 'regulatory' phase, with religious scholars and humanists playing less ofa role
than lawyers and analytic philosophers" [1]. The more success bioethics has hadwith
the courts and the legislatures, so it would appear, the further it has retreated from
the "big questions."
Traditionally, philosophy has been the guardian genius ofthe big questions. Ifnot
a blush at least a silence comes about when one moves from questions to answers.
Surely, no one would deny that the history of philosophy is replete with the
"answers" ofits major thinkers-"big answers." More critical spirits are reminded of
the conclusion one professional reviewer gave to a well-known book of its time: The
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SecretofHegel in two volumes by James H. Stirling, originally published in 1865 with,
eventually, a third edition following in 1898. The reviewer concluded: "Stirling has
well kept Hegel's secret." In any case, nobody reads Stirling any more. Where have
all the questions gone? A new generation of Hegel translators, commentators, and
scholars has whisked them away from their nineteenth-century colleagues. The
answers are still "well kept," not because the new philosophers lack incisiveness but
because philosophy is a perpetual churning, a defiler of custom, a renegade in the
house of learning. Many of the vaults of the venerable philosophers have been
broken into by body snatchers; organs and members and bones have been farmed out
to publishers. Of the major thinkers, perhaps only Descartes is safe: pieces of his
body seem to be buried or scattered all over Europe-a part of his liver in Italy, his
gall bladder in Sweden, a segment of his small intestine in Switzerland, and so on. A
philosophical travel guide would be needed to resurrect his whereabouts. Are we
ravagers oftexts as well?
If bioethics is in danger of losing touch with the "big questions," what might be
called "humanistic philosophy" is not. There remains, of course, a ratio: The smaller
or the tinier the questions, the greater the opportunity to give,a more precise answer.
What precision means in this context is another matter: what has been gained and
what has been lost in being "precise" remain relevant issues. From the arithmeti-
cian's point of view, two times two equalling four is indubitable, unshakable,
immaculate; from the Underground Man's standpoint, "Twice-two-makes-four is
.... nothing but a piece of impudence. Twice-two-makes-four is a farcical, dressed-
up fellow who stands across your path with arms akimbo and spits at you" [2]. Before
attempting to ask or answer anything, let us reflect for a moment-for as long as this
paper lasts-on our philosophical subject matter: on questioning and answering
philosophically, not only in the academy but in ordinary life. I shall try to do
this-reflect-in two ways. My first effort (let us call it Part One) will be concerned
with a humanistic view of big questions; my second effort (Part Two) will approach
the substance of Part One by way of indirection: through an account of a personal
experience, which may be taken as a story or as a kind of parable.
PART ONE
"Medicine is my lawful wife and literature is my mistress. When I get tired of
one I spend the night with the other." [3]
-Anton Chekhov
If we ask of life or of human experience: What does it all mean?, we might be
accused of asking a misposed, if not meaningless, question. The "it" in "What does it
all mean?" seems to be not only referentially obscure but rather deceitful. Is there a
proper "it" at all or only discrete events, having reasonably clear meanings, meanings
which become distorted when compressed into an "it" which throbs but never
signifies? What I propose to do now is to "take on" the "it."
If, as I think, the "it" is not reducible to the elements which supposedly comprise
the meaning of "experience" or "world," then we are all compelled to relinquish
some rather "tatty" [4] language and, in particular, renounce a cluster of botched
nouns. "Human experience" or even "the human condition" will not carry us far
enough; they have become weary bits of language: the coolies of the old existential
enterprise. Nor do philosophical neologisms help very often. Students who find
elevation in saying "presencing" as an English translation ofAnwesen, will eventually
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find that, in sullying the English language, they have caught the linguistic equivalent
of what was once called the "Spanish disease" or the "French disease" and which
may now be called the "German disease." The question is not: How can we recover
from it? but: How shall we ever recover the "it"? When in philosophical doubt, it is
not a bad idea to go back to Kant. It was the Sage of Konigsberg-I love such
appellations-who gave us a compass for philosophy, which, he maintained, asks
three questions-questions which lead to a fourth and ultimate challenge. The first
question is, What can I know?, the bounding of the theory of knowledge; the second
is, What ought I to do?, the domain of ethics; the third question is, What may I
hope?, which is directed toward the realm of religion; and the final question-the
ultimate question to which the first three lead-is, What is Man?, the anthropologi-
cal question, in the most primordial sense of that term.
The force ofthese questions lies not in their comprehensiveness but in the subtlety
through which the first three lead to the fourth. The questions are not fixed; they are
contained in the final one in a transformed manner; knowledge, ethics, and faith are
ways, whether subterranean or surface-bound, whether hermetic or mundane, of
being able to formulate the anthropological question. Anthropology here is not the
empirical science with which we are familiar but a philosophical effort, I would
suggest, to illuminate the "it" in which and with which man is a contender and
contends. The question, What is Man?, is a transcendental one and cannot be
answered by empirical inquiry. What, then, is the "it"? To call the "it" a transcenden-
tal something will surely try the patience of the most sympathetic person. I propose a
few direct answers in more straightforward language. First, the "it" is the dense
enclosure ofeveryday action, taken as a referent when and because any single item of
the everyday world fails to denote the plenum ofwhich it,is a part. Second, the "it" is
a glory of interconnections, no one of which can ever be separated out cleanly.
Everything that happens adds to, repeats, or points back to that sum of experience
which cannot be enumerated because the part has been changed by the whole it
helps to form. Abandoning any claim to being understood, however-for just a
moment-I would say that the first three questions are transfigured, preserved, and
"formed"-Hegel would say aufgehoben-in the anthropological question. The point
is that philosophical anthropology rather than bioethics is the discipline which seeks
to understand Man.
What does it all mean?, far from being a question of meditation, is better
understood as a cry of fury. The "it" is sometimes the expression of exhausted
patience: "Damn it!", "To hell with it!", "Curse it!" I recognize that there are
happier connotations in which "it" is expressed, but for the present I am interested in
a particular circumstance in which the "it" manifests a more hectic compulsion. In
War and Peace, Tolstoy describes not only the essential confusion, misguidedness,
misinformation, incoherence of battle, but calls out the lasting obscurity of it. At the
battle ofAusterlitz, Rostov asks himself: "What does it mean? What is it?" [5]. That
last "it" is closest to the "it" of: What does it mean? As for Kant's questions, we know
that the Battle of Austerlitz was won by the French; What ought the combatants to
do? Why, their duty; What may we hope? From this savagery, very little; What is
Man? For Tolstoy in War and Peace, not even wonderful, surviving Pierre can
assuage the suffering of human beings, locked into a struggle where the outcome of
the Battle of Borodino may be interpreted in contradictory ways. Best turn to one of
Tolstoy's folk tales, "Two Old Men," for example.
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It might appear that we have exchanged one set of terms for another, neither of
which is all that clear. In saying that I think that philosophical anthropology is
concernedwith more fundamental questions than are considered by bioethics, I have
no interest in criticizing bioethicists or their discipline. Rather, I am suggesting that
beneath one level of inquiry lies another: philosophical anthropology. The question
What is Man? is qualitatively ofa different order than the question What is ham? It is
not primarily a matter of complexity. The anthropological question is raised by a
being who is, at the same time, the object of the inquiry. At least, it may be said that
the anthropological question turns upon the questioner. We are asking about
ourselves. The "it" of What does it all mean? is then each of us translated into a
universality which we are. The "it" reverts to itself. One quick result of this mode of
reflection is that the status of "practical" applications or implications of philosophi-
cal anthropology are to be located in a movement of return from something taken as
simply given to the constitutive sources of any "given." If we are to treat a human
being we must understand that human being, his "givenness"-his simple presence
before us-as trailing behind it not only the data but the scenes of a life.
If the anthropological question is to be "applied" as a humanistic instrument
relevant to medicine, then the natural place and time for such application is in
medical school. Very likely, I am ill-informed about the latest changes in the
curriculum, that medical students are reading Montaigne without a brown wrapper,
that they are deep in categories, but I retain the impression that humanism and
philosophy remain "causes," not realities. The solution to overcoming a void
between humanism and medicine may no longer be found in "art"; or perhaps the
problem may be pushed back once again to the undergraduate preparation of
medical students-or further back than that. Although I have never been invited to
address an incoming class of first-year medical students, I have had such a request
from a Yale college. I declined because I knew I would say: "There's still time, go
home! Don't come! Ask your parents to get their money back! Be wise: vacate these
precincts." Since I couldn't very well extend such a greeting, I stayed away. Years
ago, I remember reading an essay by Sir William Osler in which he said something
like this to medical students, "Once in a while, put down your anatomy or physiology
text and pick up a literarywork for an interlude offifteen minutes or so." I seem to be
saying: "Every so often put down your literary work and spend fifteen minutes or so
on your anatomy." It just won't do. No doubt, that is why I haven't been invited to
give a talk to the new medical class.
What I am after lies in a different direction: not in going ahead but in going
back-returning to one's origins and sources. Man is a being who should be
characterized by such a reversal, by being a returner. To what? To what it all means.
With enough good will and extrapolation, one might find a clue to such returning in
medical terms.
In the first edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica (1771), there is an article on
medicine which contains a curious passage on what is termed "The Iliac Passion." It
begins: "The iliac passion is a pain in the small intestines, apt to turn to an
inflammation, in which their peristaltic motion is inverted, and their contents and
even the excrements themselves are voided by the mouth in vomiting" [6]. Little
wonder that the article on metaphysics follows swiftly. I don't know whether this
eighteenth-century medical phenomenon has a modern equivalent, but I have taken
the clotted, fluid archeology in the vast reversal of the iliac passion as a metaphor
appropriate to philosophy.
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PART TWO
"Seize on him, Furies, take him unto torment!" [7]
-William Shakespeare
The story I promised totell cannotbe understoodwithout apreliminary account of
what happened to me in part ofthe summer and fall of 1988, when I spent about two
months in the hospital as a patient. I will try to give a concise report of my medical
adventures. After several operations and procedures, I developed an atypical
pneumonia and suffered respiratory failure. For several weeks, I was in the intensive
care unit (ICU) of the hospital with a respiratory tube down my throat. When I left
the ICU for another floor of the hospital, I was unable to speak, whisper, or even
croak. Although my excellent doctors assured me that, in time, my voice would
return, I was meanwhile able to communicate only by writing messages. Before
proceeding any further, let me say that I was what is called a "difficult" patient,
extremely argumentative. Imagine a cafe where the patrons are chiefly medical
people, somewhere to gather for a drink or a bite to eat-suppose we call it Scarpa's
Place-andwhere two residents are discussing me:
"Have you been in to see 602?"
"Yeah, what a creep."
"What happened?"
"I asked him if he had any pain in his chest, and he tells me not pain but
pressure. What difference is there between pain and pressure, I asked him, and,
would you believe it, he starts a longbusiness about the theory ofknowledge."
"I understand that he's a professor ofpsychology."
"Yeah. That guy is really sick. They shouldn't admit people like that to the
hospital."
"Must have gotten toyou-you don't look sogood."
"I'm under a lot ofpressure."
"Feeling pain, huh?"
I should add that I had developed an ICU psychosis, which came and went
erratically. There were plots and hallucinations. For atime, Ibelieved that the nurses
were trying to poison me, that a murder had taken place close to my bed and was
beingconcealed bythe hospital securitypeople. But the most interestingfacet ofthat
psychosis went unnoticed: I believed that the present was the period between 1938
and 1942. That phenomenological treasure was lost upon everybody. During some
little squabble with an intern, I recall saying, "But don't you realize that Trotskyjust
died?" I might aswell have named Kublai Khan. All together, things did not proceed
smoothly. Neither would I "go gentle into that good night," nor would I sit quiet in
the sunshine. It was a demanding time.
The essential problem that came with my new room and myvoicelessness surfaced
soon enough. When I pressed the nurse's call button, a nurse did not come; instead, a
voice sounded from a remote part of the room: "Yes, what is it?" It was an impasse
which I brought to the attention of a high authority, who recommended a second
authority who was in charge of impasses. My family explained the difficulty. The
impasse-authority assured all of us that a special note would be placed next to my
name in the nurse's station; in fact, that all patients with particular problems-the
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blind, the deaf, and the dumb, among them-had special notations next to their
names. The speaker was crisp, forceful, lucid, foursquare, and convincing; I sus-
pected that there was a trace of lunacy in her eyes, but I believed that she believed
what she was saying. Mysuspicionwasborne out later. The entire matterofnotations
next topatients' nameswas a fantasy, a utopianwhimsy. And, I amconvinced, shedid
believewhat she was saying. It was aperfect instance ofwhat Sartre calls "bad faith."
He writes: "Bad faith ... has in appearance the structure of falsehood. Only what
changes everything is the fact that in bad faith it is from myself that I am hiding the
truth" [8]. The truth was to haunt me soon enough.
I shared my room with another patient. In fact, I stayed long enough to see a
number ofmy roommates come andgo. Unique among them was a gentlemanwhose
name I shall change to "Mr. Barnett." He was exceptionally tall, slender, and had a
very thick shock ofwhite hair. Ijudged him to be about 75 years old. His face looked
as if he had earned his white mane. Not long after he arrived, a small group of
doctors, residents, and nurses came to his bedside. A doctor proceeded to ask Mr.
Barnett a series oforientation questions:
"Where areyou?"
"Here."
"Yes, but what kind ofplace is this?"
"Miserable."
After some further exchanges ofthe same kind, the group left. When they had gone,
the first thing Mr. Barnett tried to dowas to pull out his fixed catheter. Fortunately, a
nurse happened to come in and persuaded him to lie down and desist from hiswoeful
activity. And to make certain that it was not repeated, Mr. garnett had restraints tied
to his wrists and also to his ankles. The room we shared was the last one on the
corridor, the one farthest from the nurse's station-a piece of tundra. Since Mr.
Barnett strained at his ties, made howling noises, and kicked up quite a fuss, it was
arranged (by his relatives, I assume, though I never saw anyone visit him) that he
should have whatmight be called a "minder"-someonewhowas not connectedwith
the hospital, someone whose task it was to make sure that Mr. Barnett would not
break loose. The minder sat at the foot ofMr. Barnett's bed.
It was in the morning that Mr. Barnett had arrived. That night, the minder
indicated to me that she had to use the toilet. As soon as she left the room, I saw a
thick, white snake with fingers at its end arise in Mr. Barnett's bed, visible through
the guard rail. The cunning patient had managed to worry his cloth restraint free
from his right wrist. He immediately untied the other restraints placed on him and
stood up in the center of his bed, silent and victorious. I foresaw disaster. Being far
too weak even to try to get out of bed, I did the only thing I could: I pressed the
nurse's call button. "Yes, what is it?" the electronicghost asked. I knew itwas now or
never, summoned all my vocal forces, and tried to shout, "Help!" Nothing emerged
from my mouth, not even a whisper. I pressed the button again. "Yes, what is it?"
This sequence happened about four times. My fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth pressings
were metwith silence. And n.obody came to investigate. I thought that there mightbe
some curiosity in the nurses' quarters. I tried beatingthe sides ofthe metal guard rail
on my bed. Nothing. As a last resort, I threw my plastic urinal into the hallway. It
landed with all of the ferocity of a velvet glove. Nothing. Nobody. And now the
inevitability I foresaw commenced. At first Mr. Barnett stood muttering, then he
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turned wrathful, like King Lear on the heath, and finally he started walking slowly,
perfectly balanced, toward the foot of his bed, toward that small space between the
end ofthe guard rail and the footboard. Hewas raving. Dear Mr. Barnett, I thought,
please lie down and place your head on the pillow. Relentlessly, he made his way
toward the end ofthe bed. And his raving intensified. In turn, perhaps, myown mood
changed. Ifmy fullvoice could have magically been restored at that moment, I would
have cried out, "Right on, Barnett, tell it like it is!"
And then it happened. Mr. Barnett stepped down into chaos. He fell terrifically
hard, his head striking the plaster wall with a crack that could have been heard in
Vladivostok. A clamorous ringing came from the guard rail, which part of his body
had struck-the aeolian harp ofmadness. Altogether, it made a frightful racket; the
crash brought in the troops, a procession led by a resident, followed by two nurses,
and, bringing up the rear, the minder, who, apparently had written a monograph
while answering the call of nature. After the necessary examinations, Mr. Barnett
was returned to bed in a straightjacket-Prometheus bound, though I neverlearned
whether anyone killed hisvulture. The troops departed, except for the resident, who
stood close to the wall, examining the place where Mr. Barnett's head had hit. Was
he searching for traces of blood or was he looking for hairline fractures in the
plaster? Perhaps he was not really a resident but someone from Buildings and
Grounds. Eventually, he turned from the wall and started walking toward the door.
As he passed my bed, he said, rather bitterly I thought, "Why didn't you ring for a
nurse?"
Early the following morning, Mr. Barnett was taken from the room, still in a
straightjacket. He was stretched out on a special gurney, one equipped with thick
leather straps which bound the patient every foot or so, for the entire length of his
body. His face seemed to me to be proud and prophetic. Barnett left in silence and
left silence behind him. It was rumored that he was being sent to an asylum for the
insane. What did his stay in our room signify? We had never exchanged a word or a
sign of recognition, yet a good many events had occurred. Where were the nurses
who never appeared? Where had the authority on impasses gone? There is a
difference betweenpain andpressure. AndwhywasTrotskymurdered? What does it
all mean?
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